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DISKUSSIONEN 
CHRISTA D.>..VIS ACAMPORA 
DEi\IOS AGONISTES REDUX 
REFLECTIONS ON THE STREIT OF POLITICAL AGONISi\I 
Political agonism has been a topic of growing interest among theorists of 
democratic politics for some years. \'</hile it is by no means the case that all 
contributors to that area \\·ould describe thernseh-es as Nietzschearis, riearly all 
would beriefo from further consideration of Nietzsche's conception of the aoon0 ' 
its function in the regulation of various dri\·es in communities and individuals, 
and the numerous ways in which it is n1lnerable to decay. Agonistic models 
ha'l:e been adrncated by both postmodern theorists (e.g., \'\'illiam Connolly) and 
those more in the tradition of Aristotelian conceptions of politics (e.g., Hannah 
Arendt). The Classical appropriation of the agon focuses on the significance of 
action in the publJc realm ?.s the chief '.vay in which a person realizes and 
exercises his or her political character. Thus, the agon pro\·ides an institutional 
frame\\;ork that secures, defines, and regulates legitimate engagements among 
fellow citizens. Radical democratic political theories tend to emphasize the per­
formative possibilities that are available in an agonistic arena, and how those 
possibilities facilitate and provide outlets for resistance to hegemonic and exclu­
sionary political forces. Conceived thus, a polity with commitments to the signi­
ficance of the a/,Oll allegedly allows for marginalized voices to find expression 
and to be recognized as legitimate contestants. The vision of the public good is 
not fixed in such an organization, but rather is contingent and always open to 
ne'.v possibilities.1o
Among Nietzsche scholars and critics, agonism has become a more common 
theme in discussions of l\'ictzsche's works and their applications. Recent articles 
in J.Vietzsche-Studlm grapple with the appropriation of Nietzsche's agonism in 
1 See Con no Ill, \\ ill1am E. Identity/Difference. Minneapolis 2002; and The Ethos of Plura.liza· 
tion. ;\linneapuli, 199.:i. ,\Jso see Arendt, Hann'.lh: The Human Condition. Chicago 1958; Bet· 
ween Past and luture. New York 1978; and Philnsoph\' and Politics. In: Social Research Si, 1 
(1990), pp. 73- I 03. 
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rarucal democratic political theory. Most recently, Don Dombowsky takes to 
task Alan Schrift (and by extension all those who use Nietzsche's philosophy 
to support radical democratic political theory) for his reading of Nietzsche's 
agonism. 2 Dornbowsky questions whether radical democratic poLtical theory is 
compatible with what he calls Nietzsche's aims of "recodification" 3 and domina­
tion,4 and he claims it is incumbent upon Schrift to "demonstrate ho\v Nietz­
schean agonism is more like radical democratic agonism (which affirms compe­
tition, tension and conflict) and less like fascist agonism (which also affirms 
competition, tension and conflict)." 5 Herman Siemens reviews some of the 
current literature that addresses appropriations of Nietzsche's conception of the 
agon in political theory. 6 As Siemens illustrates well the agon model applied in 
politics fruitfuilr engages aspects of Nietzsche's work but raises many new and 
important questions that have not been adequately resolved, including why 
Nietzsche himself did not apply his extensive reflections on the agon to his 
considerations of democracy; indeed, why he seemed to apply it predominantly 
to matters of culture rather than to anv ooLtical framework. Siemens claims that 
- l 
appropriations of Nietzsche's conceptions of the agon need "to show ho\v the 
agon can be used to systematically address the problems he locates in demo­
cracy."7 I \vish to sketch the ou tltnes of how such a project might take shape, 
while addressing concerns raised by Dombowsky. Ultimate ly, I shall develop two 
general themes: 1) there is still more \VOrk to be done in articulating how Nietz­
sche conceived of the limits and purposes of contest, and herein lies the distinc­
tion Dombowsb· seeks; hon·enr, 2) once more fully considered, Nietzsche's 
views of the agon cannot be faithfully applied (all the way down, so to speak) 
without fully subjecting the ideals of democracy itself to agonistic scrutiny and 
contestation, and this is \vhere the real labor of Nietzsche's agonism begins. I 
shall argue that it is not Nietzsche's aristocmtism that is problematic for radical 
democrats but rather his radica!iy. To the radical democrats, I advance further 
challenges that issue from the same texts upon which they draw, which raise 
further questions about the prospects of a Nietzschean democracy. Thus, I con­
clude, if one is truly committed to agonism as a model for potentia/91 liberatory 
political practice, one must be willing to risk a democratic order in the process. 
2 D ombowsky, Don: A Response to Alan D. Schrift's 1Yie1zsche For De111ocra~y? In: N ietzsche -
Studien 31 (2002), pp. 278 - 290. 
3 DombowksY: A Response, loc. cit., p. 283. 
4 Ibid., pp. 284 f. 
5 Ibid., p 286. 
6 Siemens, H erman: Nietzsche and agon.iscic politics: A re\·iew of recen t li te rature. In: Nicczschc­
Studien 30 (200 l ), pp. 509 - 526. 
7 Siemens: l\'ieczsche, loc. cit., p. 513. 
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I. The Good Of The Contest 
One of the most freguently raised but easily answered challenges to the 
Nietzschean agonistic model is that it lacks lim.its or checks on aggression and 
that it promotes forms of domination and violence that are incongruent with 
democratic ideals. For example, Fredrick Appel, in his iVietzsche Contra Demo­
mz~y, 8 falls just short of claiming that Nietzsche is an advocate of genocide. 
Dombowsky, in the response in question, claims, "Nietzschean agonism is basi­
cally compatible \vith the commitment to perpetual war or permanent confron­
tation characteristic of fascist ideology." 9 Appel and Dombowsky follow count­
less others who fail to acknowledge the limits Nietzsche places on agon.istic 
interactions and the distinctions he draws between resistance and violence_ 10 
Dana R. Villa, Democratizing the Agon: JVietzsche, Arendt, a11d the Agonistic Tendency 
i11 Recent Political Theoo·, 11 recommends the work of Hannah Arendt over that of 
Nie tzsche for those interested in elaborating an agonistic po litics, claiming that 
Arendt's agon is better tempered by restraints that allow for ac tive engagement 
and the exercise of judgment and respect, whereas models drawn from the 
works o f Nietzsche and Foucault devolve into the promotion of essentially reac­
tive "incessant contestation" and mere self- and group-expression.12 
As Siemens describes, the first set of charges can be easily addressed by 
reviewing the limits Nietzsche indicates for the agon in the practice of os tracism: 
a matchless force that forecloses the possibili ty of genuine engagement is subject 
co expulsion. This practice stems from an institutional comm.itment to ensuring 
the vitality of the contest rathe r than preserving the sta tus guo. Nietzsche's 
contest is further limited by the \vays in which he conceives what constitutes 
productive action within tbe agon. Nietzsche deploys a theo ry of action drawn 
on the agon.istic model. In his distinction between different modes of action 
within the contest and his investigation of whether creation or destruction is at 
\vork in those actions, one finds the emergence of a Nic: tzschean ethos of con­
test, which develops over time and is applied virtually throughout each of Nietz-
8 r\ppel, Frederick: N ietzsche Contra D emoc racy. Ithaca, Lo ndon l 999. 
9 D ombowksy: A Response, loc. cit., p. 287 . 
tn Only· somewhat more persuasil'ely docs Appel argue that Nietzsche' s philosophy is far too 
much at odds with the q?:alitarian heart of democratic ideals, but his conception of egali tarianism 
and the degree to which it is essential to "key Liberal-democratic \·erities" remains largelv unsup­
ported in his work. As I discuss below, Lawrence J. Hatab ,vrestles wi th these very issues as he 
argues for the plausibilm· o f rendering some form of democratic politics compatibie with Nietz­
sche's other philosophical proj ects and interests. 
11 Villa, Dana R.: Democratizing the Agon: .t\ietzsche, Arendt, and the :\gonistic Tendency in 
Recent Political Theory. In: \'Chy l'iietzsche Still) Berkeley 2000, pp. 224- 246. 
12 Villa: Democratizing, loc. cit., p. 225. 
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sche's w ritings. 13 i\foreover, as the agonistic model is extended to pertain not 
only to competitions among noblemen but also to physiological and political 
constitutions, what one finds is something more than merely an encomium to 
fighting or the provocation to conflict. Nietzsche's agonistic ideals do not pro­
mote reactivitv and "incessant contestation," because it is not contest for its oivn 
sake that agonistic striving seeks. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, Nietzsche sees the agon as a cultural 
and social site for the creation of a sense of the public good, a practice of 
meaning making. \'\-'hat is at stake in agonistic interaction is the authorization or 
legitimation of values and meanings - the production and definition of excel­
lence, the articulation of standards of judgment, the constitutional basis or foun­
ding of judgment itself. And as Nietzsche sought to poetically extend the meta­
phor of agon to metaphysics, he sought a unified theory of development and 
change that \vould apply not only to descriptions of processes of valuation but 
also to descriptions of all natural development, growth, and change. \Vhether 
or not the agon can adequately serve the functions Nietzsche envisioned for it 
remains a topic for further investigation, but it should be clear from the nume­
rous discussions that treat Nietzsche's conception of the agon that he is not 
simply an advocate of a form of might-makes-right Homeric nobility or the 
celebration of bravado. Rather, Nietzsche's view of agon unfolds in an attempt 
at a comprehensive interpretation of life. 
In his response to Sch rift, Dombowsky denies the applicability of Nietzsche's 
earlier ideas about the role of os tracism to his later interest in agon. Claiming 
that the Nietzsche of Homer's Contest stands far way from the Nietzsche \vho 
authored the later writings, Dombowsky endeavors to show that the later Nietz­
sche replaces his interest in contest and competition with a thirst for domina­
tion. He claims that Schrift is not sensitive to the development of Nietzsche's 
ideas and \vays in which his views about the agon in particular shift over time. 
Dombowsky claims that Nietzsche favors a unified rather than a multiplicate 
sub ject who aims for domination not merely over the multiple aspects of himself 
but of other beings, especially other human beings. But the argument D om­
bowsky endeav-ors to mount against Schrift on this point is constructed in the 
very manner about which he is critical - namely, in the course of criticizing 
Schrift for not being more attentive and sensitive to the development of Nietz­
sche's icleas over time with regard to the agon, Dombo\vsky cites snippets of 
ideas ancl phrases from the JVach!afi, Thus Spoke Zarathttstra, and B(!}Ond Good and 
Et1i!, stitching them together in a rather haphazard manner. 
1
' I sketch this de,·dopment, focusing on Nietzsche's most prominent agonises, in my j\/ietz..sche 
Contra Homer, SocrafeJ, and Paul. In: Journa l of Nietzsche studies 24 (2002), pp. 25-53. 
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Support for Dombowskv's claims depends upon attributino- to Nietzsche 
interest in a strict and rigid rank o rdering. T he evidence he mounts for this 
claim (again, drawn from fragments of a great variety of sources) supports the 
latter (i.e. rank ordering) without the qualifications that Dombowsky wishes to 
associate \Vith it, namely its rigidity. This opens up a concern that apparemly 
continues to need to be addressed despite the fact that intelligent discussions 
of these matters have appeared in the secondary li terature. The issue can be 
more narrowly focused in addressing the following ques tion: Lflhat is the relation 
be!Jveen the openness of the qgon and the creation of nett' values? 
Surely, Nietzsche's philosophy aims at creating new values and supporting 
those who might become their legislators. Th.is does not transla te into allowing 
everyone to become one's own legislator of values such that what \Ve are left 
with is a g reat re lativism (the battle over how Nietzsche's perspecti-vism stands 
in rela cion to relati\-ism has already been won, I take it). The point of supporting 
creators o f new values is to have those values received and endorsed, through 
the ways in which said values animate and make possible \"ibrant fo rms of life 
by those who hold them. How does the agon negotiate not only the sorting out 
of difference but also the regulation of the standards of judgment? Nietzsche 
admires the agon not because of its tolerance and sheer variety. It is hai led specifi­
cally and repeatedly as a mechanism for the production of value through which 
indi\0 iduals and communities become bound to, not liberated from the claims of 
values of others. 
The linchpin of DomboYvsky's case against Schrift, that the later Nietzsche 
unLike the author of Homer's Cor:test "wants the institution of agonism without 
the institution of ostracism" 14 appears to rest upon speculation abo ut how 
Nietzsche concei\"es the relation between the immoralis ts and their opponents. 
This relatio n is articulated by drawing on phrases from Tivilight of thr Idols and 
the 1Vach!ajl in which it is allegedly revealed that: 
Preserving opposition and war, tensio n and competition, is necessary and prudent 
for the "immoralists and anti-Christians", \\·ho see that it is to their "ad\·antage that 
the Church exist" (GD 1foral as \Vidernatur 3) . They do not aim to destroy the 
Christian ideal but ooh- to end its tyranny. Fo r "the continuance of the Christian ideal 
is o ne o f the most des irable things there are." T he immorab~ts require tha t their 
enemies "retain their strength", bu t at the same time they wane "to become master oi:er 
them" (Nachla8 1885-87, KSA 12, 10[117]), perhaps to make chem an instrumenr of 
gO\-ernance or for the purpose of external regulation. 13 
1-\nd so it is here that N ietzsche himself apparently "gives up the contest" 
(to borrow a phrase from N ietzsche's own H omer's Contest), evident in the fact 
14 DombO\vksy: r\ Response, loc. ci t. , p. 286. 
10 Ib id., p. 286. 
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that he "vants to ivin. But what we reaUv have here is Dombowskv co nflating 
the aims internal to agoniscic engagement with the goals external to specific 
contests chat support and regulate the agonistic institutions themselves. Oppo­
nents should nan! to win. Nietzsche never casts his conception of the a'-~on 
in any way that commits him to the facile vie"v common in various quarters of 
contemporary education that "it isn't "vhether you win o r lose but how you play the 
game". 16 For those participating in the contest, for those subjecting themsekes to 
the scrutiny of the community that provides the condition for the possibility of 
contestation, winning is surely the primary aim, although, as I have discussed else­
where, this does not necessarily commit them to the view that they must seek to 
win at any cost. 17 Clearly, desiring to compete weU is compatible with desiring to 
win, and one might prudently strive to compete well as a means toward greater 
success. But truh· great competitors do have an interest in competing well - in 
whatever ways that becomes defined by the community or institution that makes 
competition possible, other chan merely as a means to che end ofvictory. 
\Vhat great victors want are legitimate (and legitimizing) wins. By "great 
victors" I mean those whose accomplishments acquire maximal meaning in their 
communal context. There can be little doubt chat what such competitors seek 
for themselves is victory that is complete: namely, that which secures their en­
titlement co the distinction not only of having surmounted their opposition but 
also of serving as the standard bearer of what constitutes excellence in the 
context o f those particular kinds of agonis tic e:--::change. In this sense, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to say that the victor wants 111asteo·, that the victor does not 
wish co be subjected to ostracism, chat the victor might rightly consider ostra­
cism a violation o f the terms of fair play. But that does not mean that the 
community that seeks its own regulation through agonistic interaction mus t be 
similarly disposed. Nietzsche is quite mindfu.l of this difference, often much 
more so than those who continue co wrestle with the challenges of agonistic 
policies today. 18 
16 Sec, for e~ample, 1---:.ohn, Alfie: No Contest: The Case r\gainst Competition. Boston 1992. 
17 Seem\' Of Dm{2,mms Games and Dcularrl!y Dffd.,: .-.J ljpu!u,gr of;Yidz.rd;c's Contests. In: lnternacion:1l 
Studies in Philosophy 34,3 (2002), pp. 135-151. 
1, See Herman Siemens' intelligent discussion of the "medial sense of the agon" and immanent 
judgment in his .\'ietzsrhc and a,_~011istic politics, loc. cit. (esp. pp. 521-522 and 516-518). O n the 
same topic, Siemens discusses\~Gerhardt's DaJ 'Priw:;_ip des Cieidt!/il'ich!s'. In: Nietzsche-S I ien 
12 (1983). Also see Siemens, Herman: Agonal Communities of Taste: Law and communit1· in 
I\ietzsche's philosophy o f transvaluation. In: Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002), pp. 83 -
112, especialh- pp. 102-106. Siemens addresses the issue of the apparent conflict between 
respect for the a,_'.!,On and the competi tors' desi re to win in hi, ;\'ietzHhe and a2,onistir pol/tics, 
footnote 78, p. 521, where he writes, '·One cannot pla1· a game unless one wants to win ; and 
one cannot plal' to win if one is playing for the sake of the game itself. See van Tongeren, P: 
Die Moral ron Xietzsche 's Aforalkritik, Bouvier, Bonn 1989, o n 'Nietzsche's impraktikable ;-.Ioral'." 
Ir should be clear that l agree with Siemens' fi rst claim - that playing a game that has a tek ,· 
of viccon· requires wanting to win, though some games have no such aims - but dispute the 
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fl. The Democratic Cha/len~~e 
Supporting the posicion that the Nietzschean agonistic model is compatible 
wi th democracy is a more serious chatlenge than the objeccion about limits 
raised at the beginning of the preceding section. As Siemens discusses in detail, 
the relevant literature is riddled with a variety of shortcomings on this topic, 
ranging from failing to take stock of Nietzsche's critique of democracy to failing 
to appreciate precisely how Nietzsche conceived the agon to work and the possi­
ble domains to which it might extend. On Nietzsche's objection to democracy, 
consider a passage from On the Genealogy of lvforals II:12 in which Nietzsche 
reiterates his chief concern with democracy. Calling it a "misarchism," Nietzsche 
claims that the democratic sentiment "opposes everything that masters [herrscht] 
and wants to master [herrschen ivil~." 19 Such passages are often read as Nietz­
sche's endorsement of what is essentially a kind of sadism, a love to dominate 
o r even to abuse, a will to use other human beings in any and every ,vay in 
order to pursue whatever whim may come. But few seem to appreciate ,vhy 
Nietzsche might object to whatever resists en toto any domination, and why he 
is compelled to fashion a term for that sentiment - "misarchism" [Misarchis­
mus] - rather than utilize the available term "anarchism" [Anarchismtts]. Masking 
itself as anti-totalitarian, the democratic sentiment fails to recognize as a legiti­
mate interlocutor what calls into question democracy's foundation, i.e., what it 
upholds as quintessential democratic principles of equality, liberty ( conceived as 
freedom from restraint), etc. Democracy is not, in this light, lacking a ruler (o r 
free of a ruler) bu t rather exemplifies a kind of perverse form of ruling, one 
that exemplifies a hatred of ail archi, a suspicion of all ranking and ordering. Ir 
is risk-aversive; it cannot permit the most serious contest that it could possibly 
be asked to withs tand - a challenge to its core ideals. Hence, as Nietzsche sees 
it, most examples of democracy or expressions of democratic sentiment ,vork 
to thwart the contestatory engagements that might actually sen-e to legitimize 
its ends. In its endorsement of a kind of equality that insists upon sameness, 
democratic organization shuts down the con tes t by refusing to meet challenges 
of difference; it refuses to play. Hence the founding ideal o f democracy 
second - that playi ng co win and playi ng for th e sake o f the game, what I have described as 
plavmg \velJ, are mutually exclusive goals. If it were realh the case that compe titors pla1·ed 
exclusively and only co win, we might imagme tha t the best competicors would be those who 
would refuse to compete against those potentially superior ro them, that they would agree to 
engage their o ppos ition only when their opponents were dwindung m their powers, and that 
cheating would be rampant even among, perhaps especially among, the top competitors. \\ h1· 
1s it that thi s is not the case) Precisel v for the reason that competitors recognize, indeed that 
they seek out, the legi timizing function of institutionalized a.~011. \\"hat the,· seek is no t mere!l­
winning or even recognjtio n: winners \van t rJ/Miltr~efu! accom lishment. 
19 \\.alter Kaufmann's translation emended. 
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equality - is groundless, meaningless, or perhaps even duplicitous and violent 
in the ways in which it constrains agonistic engagement of its principles. 20 Per­
versely, democracy claims to ground itself on a principle of human activity, yet, 
in its stubborn refusal to subject its foundational values to scrutiny, it forecloses 
the real e:-.:ercise of that possibility. Hence, it depletes the significance of human 
existence on which it claims to found itself. An institution or state so constituted 
is careening down the path to nihilism. \'Chat remains questionable is whether 
an agonistic form of democracy could overcome Nietzsche's challenge, and to 
address that we would do well to consider a more fully developed agonistic 
theory. 
One of the most extensi\·e defenses of an agornstic democratic theory is 
found in Chantal Mouffe's The Democratic Paradox. Mouffe advocates an "agoni­
stic pluralism" that "far from jeopardizing democracy [promotes a kind of] 
agonistic confrontation [that] is in fact its very condition of its existence." 21 Her 
account bears features remarkably similar to those associated with Nietzsche's 
conception of the Greek agon. She, too, promotes a kind of opposition of the 
"worthy opponent," and she distinguishes modes of opposition (albeit perhaps 
with less specificity than Nietzsche) , contrasting antagonism with agonism: 'ene­
mies' engage in antagonism \vhile 'adversaries' struggle agonistically. 22 The 'ad­
ve rsar~·' differs from both the 'enemy' and the 'competitor' (over whom one 
seeks to win in the liberal contest of the fittes t) in that the 'adversary' recognizes 
its fellow agonise as a legitimate opponent, someone who is truly worthy of 
contention and who is sought not simply for victory for its own sake. But 
Mouffe parts 'vvith Nietzsche when she qualifies legitimation as rooted in a 
recognition of "shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal de­
mocracy: liberty and equality". 23 Obviously, mere departure from Nietzsche 's 
perspective is insufficient grounds for critique of I\fouffe's position, so let us 
consider how Mouffe's view is problematic even on her own terms and in ligh t 
of objections she herself raises agai nst other contemporary models of delibera­
tive democracy. 
i\fouffe points to the thorny issues of legitimacy and the binding force of 
agreement in forms o f deliberative democracy. The success of both the political 
20 \'Cendv Brown pro,·ocati,·ely considers these very consequences chat might be drawn from 
certain contemporary political movements chat are allegedly pursued in the name of democracy 
and justice, including sexual harassment law and legal remedies aimed ac redressing o ther inequi­
ties. See her States of byury: Pou;er and Freedom in Lale Moderni1J1• Princecon 199.S. 
21 i\Iouffe, Chantal: The Democratic Paradox. London, New York 2000, p. 103. Herea fter cited 
DP followed by the re levant page number. 
22 DP, pp. 102-3. 
23 DP, p. 102. 
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liberalism of Rawls and the communicative action of Habermas rests upon com­
mitments to some form of public reason that is excised from the realm in 
which a plurabry of values abides and would potentially thwart the prospects 
for consensus in collective decision-making. 24 Mouffe claims Rawls' separation 
o f the private from the public and Habermas' separation of procedural elements 
from their content are largely strategies for attempting to escape the ine:rnrab le 
fact of conflicting values. Why, one might ask when considering Ra\vls ' view, is 
Justice a value on which substantial "overlap" is possible wh.ile other ,-alues that 
consis tently resis t consensus are simply relega ted to the private realm? And why 
is commitment to the procedure of deliberation, as Habermas considers it, not 
itself shaped by values, and how can that procedure not be said to play ,vi th 
normative force in determining the possible outcomes?2·1 In other words, \vhy 
should the political values Rawls and Habermas esteem - what Habermas treats 
as "existential" issues about the good life and what Rawls calls "comprehensive" 
vie\vs of a "religious, mo ral or philosophical nature" 2c, - be different from 
o ther values that are deemed too difficult or impossible to reconcile? This is 
precisely the kind of separation to which Nietzsche would cry, "Foul!" Ultima­
tely, j\fouffe claims, "Rawls and Habermas want to ground adhesion to liberal 
democracy on a type o f rational agreement that \vould preclude the possibiliry 
of contestation." 27 "What they want to deny is the paradoxical nature of modern 
democracy and the fundamental tension between the logic of democracy and 
the logic of liberal.ism." 28 The clash of two types of autonomy - that found in 
individual rights to liberty and that realized through democratic participa tion in 
the name of equality - cannot be reconciled merely b~- cordoning off the realms 
in which their o\·erlap would produce conflict. 
Mouffe claims these two realms ha\·e c:Lfferent "grammars". Rather than see­
ing this as the Achilles heel of democracy, Mouffe considers alternati\·e ways of 
negotiating apparently irreconcilab le tension. She insists that, "This does not 
mean accepting a to tal pluralism, and some limits need to be put co the kind of 
confrontation which is going to be seen as legitimate in rhe public sphere. But 
the political nature of the limits should be acknowledged instead of being pre­
sented as requirements of morality or rationality." 29 \'( 'hat she advocates is the 
creatio n of political framc\vorks that promote the "m1ailabili!)' of democratic 
24 DP, PP· 89 ff. 
2" Mouffe illustra tes hO\v these problems for Rawls and Habermas are rclacecl and fo rm the b,1si , 
o f th eir disag reements. See their arti cle:, she cites: Habermas , Jiirgen : Reconciliation Through 
the Pub lic Use of Reason : Remarks on John Rawls ' s Politica l Li beralism." In: T h e.: Jo urnal or 
Philosophy X..\.CII, 3, (199:i), and Rawls , John: l n: Reply to Habermas. ln: The Jou rnal of 
Ph il osoph:· XCI I, 3, (199:i). 
26 DP, p. 89 . 
27 DP, p. 92. 
28 DP, p. 93. 
29 DP, p. 93. 
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forms of individuality and subjectivity." 30 Such a model is recommended as 
refocusing the question of citizenship and reconceiving the subject not as meta­
physically discrete and endowed with natural rights but as emerging from "social 
and power relations, language, culture and the whole se t of practices chat make 
agency possible." 31 Such a view cakes as yet undecided (i.e., contestable) "the 
conditions of existence of the democratic subject." 32 
Although 1\fouffe does not envision the agonistic polity as calling into ques­
tion the ,;ery commitment co democracy to which the agon is supposedly su ited, 
she does recognize that the commitment to democratic values - democracy's 
legitimation, in other words - must be founded not upon rationally justified 
first principles that are masked as objective or value-free, but rather upon shared 
forms of life. Citing \'x?itcgenstein, l\louffe likens this to "'a passionate commit­
ment to a system of reference. Hence, although it's belief, it is really a way of 
living, or of assessing one's life'." 3·' Translated back into N ietzschean terms, the 
agon potentially crafts a contentious arena that produces public meaning-making 
of the most significan t sort: shaping the meaning of human being and the 
constel lation of values that follow from it. Insofar as agonis tic interaction provi­
des a mechanism for generating meaning and value, the political agon afford s 
investment in the good of the good life. It gathers the values that serve as the 
grist of political judgment. This, I take it, is the aim of what Nietzsche calls 
"legis lation" or value creation. It is what gives shape and content to our willing 
such tha t it becomes shared (i.e., legi timated) in the judgment that renders it 
victorious. 34 
j\fouffe thinks her model has a further ad,·ancage m·er forms o f deli berative 
democracy in that hers allows for recognition of pmver as constituti\·e: "Since 
any political order is the expression of a hegemony [ ,vhere hegemony is charac­
terized as the colhsion and collapse of power and obj ecti\·ity], a specific pattern 
:w DP, p. 95. 
31 DP, p. 93. 
} 2 DP, p. 96. 
3
-' DP, p. 97. ;\lo uffe cites \\'i ugens tein, Lud\vig: Philosophical lm·estiga c.ions. Oxfo rd 1958, p. 
46e. 
34 Such considerac.ions lie at the heart of the conflic t between reason and persuasion as ?'--:1e rzsche 
sees it. Reason, when considered as having judicial force that exceeds any and all power that 
might potentially emerge through persuasion, is lictle more than masked tyranny. The ep istemic 
and moral force of rea son requires f~gi!im(lfion, as N'ie tzschc sees it. \'( 'hen tne rational thoroughly 
eclipses the rhe torical , the result is a srulc.ification o f the mechanism through which legitimation 
can be forged. Reaso n must earn the right to legislate: to exe rci se and direc t a form of will , to 
create and arbi ra re values. This does not mean that reason becomes simply one among marn· 
kinds o f bases for soc ial o rgani zation , among which we have no criteria for determining which 
is besc or most approp riate. \'{ .. hat it does mean is that reason or the rational is no t mere ly and 
always presumed to be uni versa l, its au tho rity is not gi,·en a p riori. Reason is thus objecc.ionab le 
to Nie tzs che because o f its unfo11nded (i.e. , unlegis lated) hegemony and its annihib c.ion of the 
legic.imation p rocedures it obliterates as it circumvents them. 
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of po\ver relations, political practice cannot be envisaged as simply representing 
the interests of preconstituted identities themselves in a precarious and always 
vulnerable terrain."·35 The challenge to be faced in late modernity is not how to 
eliminate power, as Mouffe sees the objectives of the deliberative models she 
considers, but rather "how to create forms of power more compatible with 
democratic values." 36 Echoing (faintly, perhaps) Nietzsche's admiration of the 
role of ostracism in the Greek agon, Mouffe claims, 
Corning co terms with the constitmi,:e nature o f power implies relinquishing the idea l 
of a democratic society as the rea lization of a perfect harmo ny or transparency. The 
democratic character of a society can only be g iven by the fact that no limited social 
ac tor can attribute to herselt or himself the representation o f the to tali ty and claim 
to have the 'mastery' of the fo undation. 37 
With Nietzsche, tfouffe might grant that it is not to be expected that there 
will be no aspiring masters but rather that the social order must seek to regulate 
those desires or be prepared to undertake the rather undemocra tic activity of 
exclusion, because the emergence of such a mas ter \voulcl effec tively obliterate 
the basis o f the (in Mouffe' s case, democratic) regime. In o ther words, although 
Mouffe herself does not pu t it this way and may not ev·en endo rse such a cla im, 
it seems the agon.istic democracy needs bo th hegemOllJ' as its constitutional ba­
sis - the " legislation" and creation of the values and common forms of life 
that m ake the democratic subject a possibility - and exclusion when the hegemo­
nic forces become so concenaated that they suppo rt to talitarianism. This strikes 
me as perfectly compatible -..\·irh Nietzsche's conception of the role of os tracism 
in the Greek agon, but is it palatable fo r those committed to democratic values, 
including j\fouffe herself? 
\\ 'hy should the desirability of democratic values be immune to critique? 
J\fouffe loosens ratio nality from its concrete basis in the o rdering o f democratic 
values in the ·works of Rawls and Habe rmas, and claims that a be tter democratic 
order \vould be one in \vhich ,ve could contest the content and priority of such 
values. But can democracy do precisely what Nietzsche suspected it could not -
put its own value on the Lne and ge nuinely fight to legitimize the basis of its 
own hegemony? j\fouffe's admjrab le model still does no t answer this question. 
A democra tic theory that would call itself "Nietzschean" 38 - or one that could 
withstand the Nietzschean challenge - must be wilLng to risk itself. It must 
fully recogruze its contingency and fragility; it must be willing to face tyranny 
35 DP, pp. 99 -1 00. 
JG DP, p. 100. 
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- DP, p. 100. 
JS Mouffe's does not; she claitns to cake her inspiration chiefly from \\ ittgenste in and Derrida. 
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and to meet it as a '.vorthy opponent. But precisely this would not be permissible 
as tfouffe gives content to agonistic respect. 39 
Recall that the adversary differs from the enemy in the way that the adversary 
is recognized as a legi timate opponent because of the shared commitments 
specifically to democratic principles. Mouffe's adversaries recognize or agonisti­
cally respect only fellow democrats. This is problematic not only for the unde­
mocratic kind of exclusion it sanctions (e.g. , it would presumably exclude from 
legitimate public discourse those seeking to bring about theocratic solu tions to 
political problems) , but also because of the way in which it effectively engineers 
the kinds o f contests that might emerge. Mouffe's adversaries will differ only in 
terms of the content they give to those liberal democra tic principles of " liberty 
and equa1iry,"4' 1 and hence the point ofthe contest 1vill alway and on!J be to give meaning 
to those tJi·o mlues. l\fouffe claims that the chief aims of an agonis tic pluralism are 
mobilization of passions around democratic objectives and the transformation 
of antagonism to agonism, thereby further inscribing a commitment to demo­
cratic principles. ,'\nd so, in the end, the luerarchy o f values 1fouffe cri ticizes in 
the works of Habermas and Rawls is merely reordered w ith liberty and equality 
beating out reason. She has not escaped the problem of erecting a hierarchy o f 
values that has the consequence o f determining in adl/ance, at least to some extent, 
the forms of life that might follow from chat order. 
:19 I cake 1t that .\ (o uffe's model of the adwrsan is her attemp~ to give Connolly's no tio n of 
"agonistic respect" more content, and it alleged!:: aims to ~reserve a strong sense of hos tili tY 
JD the struggle. She is concerned that o cher agonisuc theorises draw on the concept of agon istic 
respec t in ways that ultimately, " eliminate the antagonistic dimension which is proper co the 
politiol. T he kirid of plural ism the\ celeb rate implies the possibilitY of a pluralit\· without 
antagonism, of a fri end witho ut an enemr, an agonism wichour antagonism" (DP, p. 134). In 
her final chapter, she suggests chat an ethics of psychoanalysis, dra\\·n heavily from Lacan and 
developed in the writings o f Z i5:ek (e.g., Enio:· Your Sympcom1 London 1992), is better suited 
co a late or postmodern conception of human exis tence and the nature of political action (see 
DP, pp 129- 140). Connoliy's conception of agonistic respect ga thers its bearings more from 
the sphere of the ethical than the poLitical. He figures agonistic respect as emerging from the 
shared existential condition of the struggle for identity and as shaped by o ur recognitio n o f o ur 
finitude. Thus concei\·ed, agonistic rc,pect is "a respectful strife with the o ther achieved throug1' 
intensified experience of loose strands and unpursued possibi lities in oneself char exceed the 
terms o f one's official identity" (Connolly: Identity/D ifference, Joe. cit. , p. 166). It fac ili tates 
an appreciation for difference and recogni tion of the ways in which identity is consti tuted by 
and therefore dependent upon difference. It emerges from the recognition of mutual "contin­
gency in [ ... ] being" (ibid., p. 179). Connolly em·isions an "agonism o f difference, in which 
each o pposes the o ther (and the other's p resump tive beliefs) while respecting the adversary at 
another level as one whose contingen t o rientations also rest on shaky epistemic grounds" (ibid., 
178) ..·\ gonistic respect in the political realm manifests "bet'\\·ccn rough equals" while relations 
" bet'\veen an oppressed constituency and its respondents" are characterized by "critical responsi­
veness," (Connolly: The Ethos of Pluralization, loc. cir. , p. 234 n 38), which is "an ethical 
rela tion a pri\·ileged constituency ern1blishes with culturally de\·alued constituencies stri\·ing to 
enact new identities" (ibid., p. 235 n 40). 
40 DP, p. 102. 
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At this point we can anticipate a good response to my objection: What it 
means to ho ld ,·alues at ail includes ha\·ing some sort of hierarchy or ranking 
of those values (i.e., that the meaning of values entails their relations to other 
values). \Vhat I find problematic is not j\fouffe's having a hierarchy of values 
as such - that seems to be precisely what legislating, in the sense l have used 
the term here, means. \\-hat is problematic for those committed to the (demo­
cratic) good of agonistic exchange is having a hierarchy of values that exempts 
itself from the need to ground its authority agonistically. It should also be clear 
that the Nietzschean objection to Mouffe's version of agonistic pluralism is not 
her establishment of limits. Nietzsche em·isions numerous constraints on the 
agon, but he would not g ran t the exclusion of prospecti\·e agonists intent on 
defending a different \'isio n of what should consti tu te judgment in the agonistic 
arena. :i\fouffe's exclusion of all those who do not share a commitment to "li­
berty and equality" requires justification and a defense against the charge that it 
is too constricti,·e. 
!II. Redux 
But one might object that I am perhaps demanding too much of demo­
cracy - indeed, that I ha\·e asked it to be (or to be wiLling to become) what it 
is not. Perhaps it seems that what I ha,-e sought is democratic agouism rather 
than agonistic demomur By insisti ng that deep democraC\· must be willing to 
au thorize or re-authorize its constitutional principles, perhaps I expose demo­
cracy to risks it cannot afford. Perhaps meeting the challenges above would 
require democracy to hold its constitutive \·alues of liberty and equality too 
lightly, all too playfully, such that it could not truly offer a \-iable framework for 
political action at all. \\.h\· would any political order so \1:illingly invite its usurpa­
tion? Indeed, what sort of order; or arc/Ji, could such a scheme be;:, It seems to 
me that a democratic polity is the most conducive to a radicalized agonistic 
politics. Only democrac~· seems capable o f negotiating contingent manifestations 
o f po,ver and order with enough fl exibility to allow that order to be contested 
and reconst.ituted. Still, that does not lead me to the conclusion that Nietzsche 
o ught to ha\-e been an advocate of democracy or that he failed to appreciate 
democrac\ in its truest sense. It is not clear to me that democracv could sustain 
. , 
thorc)ugh-going agonism and still remain democratic. l\evenheless, I think an 
agonistic pluralism, even the likes of which 0fou ffe offers, must ultimately in­
volve itself in some significant risk, co risk "going to ruin" (z1(!!/flllde gehen) as 
Nietzsche's Zarathustrn describes the process of self-o,-e rcoming. If a democra­
tic constitution requires a radical openness to conccstability - as each of the 
agonistic theorists insists - then it must be willing to meet all prospective 
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contestants, 41 not simply those who are like-minded but disagree about the 
details. 
The single most-sustained account of a !.Vietzschean democracy, which draws 
heavily on ideas elaborated in Homer's Contest, remains Lawrence J. Hatab's A 
1Vietzschean Defe;m of Democraq, 42 and it is ,vorth revie,\·ing in the context I ha,·e 
established as the strongest case for a specifically l\ietzschean political agon. 
Hatab demonstrates that Nietzsche's critique of democracy follows his critique 
of morality. In particular, the liberal democratic sense of freedom as freedom­
from-restraint is cast as identical in form to the kind of freedom sought in 
slavish morality: a reactive manifestation of power that artificially effects its 
domination over would-be oppressors by reversing the terms on which freedom 
and autho ri ty are pursued and legitimized . The values that drive such a concep­
tion of freedom - e.g., equality - and the metaphysical assumptions it brings 
in its wake - e.g., the rational, autonomous political subject - are at odds ,vith 
the order of stri,·ing forces envisaged in ~ietzsche's conception of nature and 
human social realitY, and are largely unsustainable without appeal to a supreme 
creator and guarantor of metaphysical sameness and entitlement. Hatab argues 
that Nietzsche's critiques of democracy largely aim at exposing the questionable 
foundation of (particularly) liberalism's most cherished ideals and constitutional 
assumptions. 43 He then considers whether democracy could withstand the chal­
lenges posed by Nietzsche (i.e., hi s questioning of its apparently foundational 
idea ls) . In particular, Ha tab considers the viabili ty of democracy sans the ideal 
of metaphysical equality, whil e preserving procedural c:quality (i.e., equalit~· be­
fore the la\.v) and equal opportunity for participation. Ultimately, Hatab argues, 
"democratic values can be defended without any sense of equality that connotes 
some positi\·e description o r condition of human nature, or that stems from 
some kind of metaphysical essenrialism."-+-+ Loosened from the grip of substan­
tive egalitarianism, democracy, Hatab claims, can be rendered compatible with 
o ther key Nietzschean insigh ts regarding perspectivism, truth, and ethics. 
Hatab's notion of agonistic respect differs from j\fouffe's. Fo r Hatab (agonis­
tic) "[d]emocratic respect [... ] depends not so much on regarding others posi ti­
vely as upon recognizing the finitude and contingenc\ of one's own beli efs and 
interests. Again, a myopic disrespect or disregard can be e\·ident in am· , ·1e,, -
"' 
1 Of course, some ,·isions of the pu!Jlic good might not be wor .11· contesunts in the sense that 
they arc i11capavle of mounting a real chaLienge w the e-;.isting orJe r (e.g., that we should e-;tend 
,·oring righ t, to l 'rantian aliens) . That sense o f " worthiness" howe,·er is much different from 
the sense described by l\fou ffr. 
42 References for citations of Hatab 's A ;\"ietzsd.•,',,11 DP/msi' of Dt li!ocmo (Chicagu 199:i) are abbre­
viated t\'.D. 
4
.i ND, pp. 22-39. 
44 ND, p. 59. 
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point (including even 'liberal' outlooks), so any remedy would have to begin with 
loosening the fix ation of convic tion." 45 Nevertheless, even agonistic democratic 
respect is chiefly democratic as it retains for Hatab a paramount concern for 
democratic principleJ·: "a basic attitude [ .. . ] essential to democracy" is that "[ f] rom 
a political standpoint u;e must value democratic procedures more than our own beliefs."46 
Hatab strives to figure these procedures primarily as rules of engagement, com­
mitments that ought to be able to be accommodated \.v ithin a Nietzschean 
agonistic framework given Nietzsche's appreciation for the necessity of limits 
to the contest. But is this disposition toward democratic procedures really analo­
gous to the limits Nietzsche recognized as compatible with the agonistic organi­
zation of the Greeks) I am inclined to say that they are not. Such democratic 
procedures are decision mechanisms, and an attrac ti ve (and mos t promi sing) 
feature of the agon, as Nietzsche imagines it, not necessa rily as he considered it 
practiced in ancient Greece, is the prospect that agonistic interactio ns potentially 
serve as occasions not only for distingui shing individuals (and the \·isions of the 
good they might ad\.·ance or represent) but also for calling into question the 
ve ry standards of judgment (o r deci sion procedures) themselves. H ence, the 
commitment to democratic procedures that Hatab claims as intrinsic to agonistic 
respect in the context of democracy \.vould need to be (a t least potentia!b') subject 
to contestato ry revision or suspicion as well. Can Hatab 's (o r anyone else's) 
agonistic democ::-acy sustain that constant threat? That one might be hard pres­
sed to consider any political arrangem nt capable of resi lience to such ri sks 
might indicate that the agcn, at least in rhe revolutionary way ir is sometimes 
conceived by Nietzsche, is no t viable for politics. If it is the case that Nietzsche's 
agonism is incompatible with democracy as I describe it here, it is owing less 
to his aristocratism than his radicalism. 
Hatab claims the kind of "susp icio n" allowed and sustained in an "agonar­
chy" - a political order contingent upon "wide-open" contestatory pra:-.:is for 
po litical decision-making - is highly compatible with Nie tzsche 's perspec tivism 
and his critiques o f dogmatism. Democracy, Hatab claims, is particularly \veil 
su ited to "a politics o f suspicio n," and it can be "max imized in a postmodern 
atmosphere to unmake unwarranted fixtures wherever they may reign - e\·en, 
and especially within, democracy itsel f." 47 One might \·ery well ask p reciseh­
how close to the heart of democracy those fixtures migh t be questioned, and 
what, mo re precisely, constitut s warranty in an agonarchy, as H atab conceives 
lt. 
In his vision of agonistic democracy, Ha tab acknowledges that hi s conception 
of democracy does not admit of legitimation. Fundamentally, he claims, democracy 
-t:) 1'0, p. 67. 
46 ND, pp. 67 - 8. 
~
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is "both the crfation and i12terrogatio11 of social goods" 48 rather than an ad\·ance­
ment of specific \-alues concei\·ed as good a priori. In this respect, I consider 
Hatab's view to be superior to that of Mouffe at least with regard to the matter 
of consistency within an agonistic model and, in Hatab's case, \Vithstanding the 
Nietzschean challenge as I have described it above. Hatab claims, "we should 
restrict reflections on democrac~- to procedural matters, in such a way that any 
'baseline' com·iction about philosophical questions would be a contestant in, 
rather than a presupposition oj, political discourse."-19 "An agonistic democracy 
should presume nothing other than the ci\·ic attitude and the procedu ral require­
ments that foster the fair competition of baseline beliefs for the prize of con tingent 
decisions." so 
Hatab's discussion of will to power as it rela tes to agonistic political power 
also ra ises some problems. He concei\·es of will to power as "an agonist ic field, 
wherein pow·er is pluralized and contim1ally checked by challenges in an interplay 
of power sites." 5 1 But will co power is not exhaus ted by agonistic relations, and 
the t{gon does not always seem to support the kind of "check" in terms of 
"balance" that democracy theoretically a ffo rds. Po\ver is always subject to chal ­
lenge in the Nietzschean agonistic arena, but that does no t mean that it is always 
thwa rted from domination and oppression. I t is merely tyranny that 1\ictzsche 
thinks is avoided \\·hen an agon is adequ;:,tely moderated by ostracism, and one 
should be m indful of just ho\v close to tnanny N ietzsche thinks the pursu it of 
freedom treads as h e articulates it in Twi/{gh.t ~l thr Idols - "fiv steps from 
tyranny, close to the threshold of the d,rnger of servitude" (T I, Skirmishes of 
an Untimely Man 38). 52 In order for one to be faithful to Nietzsche (or e,-en 
to a view considered JVietzschea11) that threshold must remain precisely that -
right at the door of tyranny, at times perhaps breathlessly shy of crossing O\·er 
the saddle. 
Perhaps mos t relevant to addressing this particular concern is Hatab's brief 
section about "nonprocedural agonistics" in a democracy. Nonprocedural agoni­
stics are "opportuni t ies at the margins of polttical procedures for defeated inter­
ests."5·' The~- may cake numerous forms, including ac ts of ci\·il disobedience . 
Hatab cautions, hO\vever, that the\· '\voulcl have to be peaceful, since violence 
and rebell ion cross the edge of defensible political prac tice - at least in a 
properly functioning democracy." 5-l As I argue in the firs t sec tion of this paper, 
48 ND, p. 79. 
49 ND, p. 85. 
50 ND, p. 86. 
51 ND p. 75. 
02 "fonf Schntt \\·eit ,·on der Tnannci , dicht :m der Schwelle der Gefahr der r--:_nechcschafr" (GD, 
Streifzi.ige eines L1nzeitgemaGen 38) 
S?) ND, pp. 91-92. 
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one can deri \·e a similar limit to legitimate agonistic engagement from Nietz­
sche's philosophy, although he reaches that conclusion not based upon respect 
for democrac:· but rather from an e thos of agonism broadly conceived. Nonpro­
cedural agonistics allO\v for the (informal) challenge and interrogation of the 
very procedural elements or prevai ling standards effecting the exclusion or de­
feat that mo ti\·a tes the extra-procedural conflict. 
Abm·e, I insist that a political order modeled on Nietzsche' s ideas about the 
agon, would ha\·e to allow for a kind of thorough-going critique that none of 
the most extensive accounts of agonistic democracy seem to be able to accom­
modate, and which I doubt any political order (in so far as it remains an orde­
ring) could sustain. But Hatab opens the door at this juncture for incorporating 
such an openness to challenge by locating it at the margins of a democratic 
polity. It is, finally, to precisely these so rts o f considerations that I wish to direct 
future disc ussions of Nietzsche's agonism. A greater effort t0 elaborate whether 
and how democracy is particularly well suited to support these sores of agonistic 
relations would certainlv advance the discussion and could form the basis of 
the most promising lines of pursuit for a productive rapprochement beGveen 
Nietz sche 's philosophy and contemporary political theory. 
